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ABSTRACT 
The legal frameworks in most jurisdictions make provision for early intervention in bank resolution 
as an exception to the general corporate formal insolvency regime. The exercise of the early 
intervention powers however contravenes well established shareholder rights and gives rise to legal 
acrimony as seen in the deluge of litigation that trailed the exercise of these powers in Nigeria in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.  This article examines the justification for 
early intervention regime in bank resolutions and considers the nature of the framework in Nigeria. 
Drawing examples from the framework in the United Kingdom and the United States, it considers 
the strengths and weaknesses of the Nigerian framework. While arguing in favour of its continued 
operation, it considers the ways of bolstering the extant framework in Nigeria. 
 





While commenting on the special nature of banks, Corrigan identified three essential 
characteristics that distinguish them from all other classes of institutions.1 They 
include: the fact that they offer transaction accounts, are the backup source of 
liquidity for all other institutions and are the transmission belt for monetary policy.2 
In addition, they also provide the valuable service of maturity transformation and 
operate as financial intermediaries that are central to the efficiency of the financial 
system of any economy. They have therefore been described as basic market 
infrastructure and public utility deserving of special attention.3  Expounding on the 
role of banks in this regard, the HM-Treasury in one of its reports notes that banks 
in the financial system “perform a crucial role in securing the efficiency of the 
economy by providing firms and individuals with a secure means by which to make 
and receive timely payments; monitoring the performance of borrowers on behalf of 
savers to ensure that funds are appropriately channelled and loans are repaid in a 
                                                
* LLB (Ibadan), BL., LL.M (Cambridge), Ph.D (Cambridge). A lawyer in the international law firm of 
White & Case LLP, London, England. 
1 The word ‘bank’ as used in this article is confined to institutions that offer transaction accounts that 
are connected to the payment system and provide liquidity. This definition therefore excludes 
merchant banks where they are prohibited from accepting deposits that can be withdrawn by cheques. 
2E G Corrigan, ‘Are Banks Special?’ Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Annual Report (1982) 
<http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=684> accessed 8 
December 2012; E Kelley, ‘Are Banks Still Special’ (1997) 13 BIS Review 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r970214d.pdf> accessed 8 December 2012; E G Corrigan, ‘Are Banks 
Special? A Revisitation’ (1 March 2000) 
<http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3527> accessed 8 
December 2012 




timely manner; allowing credit-worthy borrowers to have access to funds with which 
to tide-over temporary income shocks, thereby avoiding costly disruptions to 
consumption and investment plans; allocating the savings of households and 
businesses to opportunities expected to yield the highest risk adjusted return, raising 
the sustainable rate of economic growth and employment; and orchestrating the 
distribution of risks to those most willing and able to hold them”.4  
Recognising the special attention required by banks in this regard, most 
global and regional initiatives dealing with resolution and insolvency expressly 
exclude banks from the scope of their operation.5 At the national level, although a 
number of countries had long established special regimes for bank resolution, the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2009 (GFC) generated the political momentum 
required for the adoption of special regime by many others that did not deem it 
necessary to have special regimes for bank resolution before then.6  These special 
legislations for bank resolution essentially establish a framework that enable 
applicable regulatory authorities intervene in the affairs of banks before they are 
adjudged insolvent on the basis of inability to pay their debt as they fall due (cash 
flow test of insolvency) or of their liabilities exceeding assets (balance sheet test of 
insolvency).  
It is argued that in view of the importance of the services provided by banks 
and their interaction with members of the public, they need to be subjected to special 
framework in order to protect depositors and safeguard the economy.7    The point is 
                                                
4 HM-Treasury, Pre-Budget Report 2008: Facing Global Challenges: Supporting People through 
Difficult Times, (2008) 43, available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr08_chapter3_190.pdf 
accessed 12 December 2012. 
5 Examples of the international initiatives excluding banks from their scope of operation include the 
World Bank Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, IMF’s 
Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key Issues, the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross 
Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment (Model Law), the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on 
Insolvency Law (Legislative Guide), the Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation 
(Practice Guide), the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part Three: Treatment of Enterprise 
Groups in Insolvency (Legislative Guide II and together with the Legislative Guide, the Legislative 
Guides), the European Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, the Cross-Border Insolvency 
Concordat adopted by the Council of the International Bar Association Section on Business Law in 
Paris on 17 September 1995 and by the Council of the International Bar Association in Madrid on 31 
May 1996, the Cross-Border Insolvency Guide to Recognition and Enforcement5 and the Statement 
of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts developed by the International 
Association of Restructuring, Insolvency & Bankruptcy Professionals (INSOL). See generally, 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law Part three: Treatment of Enterprise Groups in 
Insolvency (2010) 4; UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation (2009); 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (2004) part 2, I (c); World Bank, Principles and 
Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (2001) para. 85; International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures – Key Issues (1999) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/index.htm> accessed 21 December 2012; 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment (1997) Ch. 1, Art.1 
(2); European Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, Art. 1(2). 
6 For example, in the United Kingdom the Banking Act 2009 which received royal assent on 12 
February 2009 addressed the immediate need for a special bank resolution regime following the global 
financial crisis of 2008-2009.  Similarly, on 1 January 2011, the German Act on the Orderly 
Restructuring and Liquidation of Banks (“Bank Reorganization Act”), the German Act on the 
Establishment of a Bank Restructuring Fund, and the German Act for the Extension of Time 
Limitations Barring Management Liability (collectively, the “Bank Restructuring Act”) came into 
effect. See also Financial Stability Board, Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Finance 
Ministers and Governors, (2010) 128. 
7 See C England, Are Banks Special? Available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv14n2/v14n2-3.pdf accessed 21 December 2012. 
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also made that in view of the fact that a bank is worth more when alive than when 
dead,8 applicable regulatory authorities must be able to intervene early enough in the 
affairs of a bank in order to contain the potential losses that could accrue should it 
be considered necessary to ‘bailout’ the bank. Expatiating on the nature of an 
effective early intervention regime for banks, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
in a recent paper noted that for competent authorities to be able to intervene rapidly 
in a manner that preserves the critical functions of banking institutions, they would 
require powers  to:  (a) take action well before balance sheet insolvency, (b) 
unilaterally restructure the various claims of an institution, (c) conclude mergers and 
acquisitions without shareholder consent, (d) provide bridge financing without 
shareholder consent, (e) assume public ownership of the institution on a temporary 
basis once shareholders and unsecured creditors have absorbed the necessary losses 
and (f) power to temporarily suspend termination provisions contained in some 
financial contracts in order to limit contagion and preserve certain critical functions.9 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) in its Key Attributes of Effective Resolution 
Regimes for Financial Institutions also makes recommendations along the same lines 
as those of the IMF.10  
Attempts to exercise these early intervention powers in the Nigerian banking 
sector in the aftermath of the GFC was however greeted by protests and a litany of 
litigious suits challenging the validity of regulatory responses and seeking to upturn 
regulatory actions.11 Restructuring plans and arrangements also had to be subjected 
to shareholder and judicial approval at court ordered meetings which led to extensive 
delays as these were held up by pending suits before the courts on the matter.12 
Shareholder rights in the UK and the US also resulted in similar challenges 
highlighted by the failed attempt of the Barclays Group to take over the operations 
of Lehman Brothers due to the requirement to convene a shareholder meeting 
within the available time to approve the proposed restructuring plan at the time.13 
Also, the delays and frustrations that resulted from the shareholder litigation that 
encumbered the resolution plan proposed for Fortis Bank by the Dutch, Belgian and 
Luxembourgish regulatory authorities together with BNP Paribas presents another 
                                                
8 G G Kaufman, Market Discipline in Banking: Theory and Evidence (Emerald Group Publishing 2003) 
193. 
9 IMF, Resolution of Cross-Border Banks – A Proposed Enhanced Coordination (2010) 20 – 21. 
Similar recommendations were also made by Institute of International Finance, A Global Approach to 
Resolving Failing Financial Firms: An Industry Perspective (2010) 25 – 29. 
10 See FSB, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (2011) 7-8. 
Similar recommendations were also made by Institute of International Finance, A Global Approach to 
Resolving Failing Financial Firms: An Industry Perspective (2010) 25 – 29. 
11 See D Iriekpen, ‘High Court Halts Operations of Nationalised Banks’ (Thisday  Lagos 6 November 
2011) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/high-court-halts-operations-of-nationalised-
banks/102925/> accessed 21 December 2012; D Iriekpen, ‘FG Moves to Defend Keystone Bank’ 
(Thisday  Lagos 21 November 2011) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/fg-moves-to-defend-
keystone-bank/103300/>  accessed 21 December 2012, D Iriekpen, ‘Nationalised Banks: 
Shareholders Flay CBN’ (Thisday Lagos 16 December 2011) 
<http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/nationalised-banks-shareholders-flay-cbn/105181/> accessed 
21 December 2012; E Otaru, ‘FG Challenges Suit in Nationalised Banks Case’ (Thisday Lagos 18 
March 2012) <http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/fg-challenges-suit-in-nationalised-banks-
case/111689/> accessed 21 December 2012 
12 Central Bank of Nigeria, Public Statement on the Recapitalisation of Eight Nigerian Banks (9 June 
2011) 5 
13 See A R Valukas, ‘Report of Examiner to the United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of 




example of the challenges posed to early intervention powers by provisions that seek 
to guard shareholder rights.  
This situation therefore creates the tale of two diverging interests and 
presents the familiar challenge in policy development where a balance has to be 
struck between two competing positive objectives. In this case, it is the need to strike 
a balance between the objective of protecting the interest of shareholders as 
guaranteed constitutionally and under corporate law provisions in a country like 
Nigeria and achieving the objective of safeguarding financial stability through the 
establishment of effective bank resolution regimes. The article explores this issue and 
examines the efficacy of the extant framework for early intervention in Nigeria.  
The rest of the article is arranged as follows. The second section considers 
the justifications for early intervention by examining the special nature of banks. It 
does this by considering the nature of banking assets and banking business. It 
explores the nature of banks as public utilities, their fragility and interconnection as 
arguments in favour of the early intervention regime in bank resolution frameworks. 
The third section considers the extant legal framework for early intervention in 
Nigeria and compares this with the position in the United Kingdom and the United 
States in order to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the framework for early 
intervention in Nigeria. The fourth section considers the manner in which 
shareholder rights could hinder the effective operation of the early intervention 
regime in Nigeria and the final section presents the conclusion and discusses the 
ways of bolstering the extant framework for effective operation of the early 
intervention regime in Nigeria.  
 
Banking Assets  and Businesses 
The central business of a bank is to accept deposits from members of the 
public and provide loans and credit from the deposits received and borrowings from 
other banks known as inter-bank loans/deposits. Banks therefore typically hold 
highly liquid liabilities which can be withdrawn at any time against long term lending 
in the form of loans to individuals and companies which may not be repaid by 
borrowers. Thus, although the bank would in virtually all cases have to make the 
deposit made by depositors available to them as at and when they are needed, there 
is no guarantee that those to whom the bank provides loans would honour their 
obligations and repay the loans. Even if borrowers repay their loans, there would still 
be a problem because of the mismatch between the term of the loans granted to 
lenders and the term of transaction accounts issued by banks to depositors. These 
accounts allow depositors to incur liabilities that are payable on demand and to 
transfer the entire sum standing to the credit of the depositor to a third party.14 This 
creates a major risk known as credit risk which would have to be managed effectively 
for the bank to be continuously viable.15  Generally, this risk is curtailed by requiring 
the bank to hold a certain level of capital depending on the level of risk to which the 
bank is exposed and the bank would also usually price expected credit risks into the 
cost of lending along with its margin for profit.16 The fragile nature of the banking 
industry however means that it is possible in exceptional situations that a large 
number of depositors may demand immediate repayment of their savings at the first 
                                                
14 Corrigan, ‘Are Banks Special?’  (n 2) 3 
15 Credit risk refers to the risk that a counterparty of the bank would not fulfill its financial obligations 
to the bank in accordance with agreed terms. See BCBS, Principles for the Management of Credit Risk 
(September 2000) 1. 
16 J G Caprio and D Klingebiel, ‘Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad Policy, or Bad Banking’ (Annual 
World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1996) 3-4. 
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indication of any form of trouble in the industry.17 In this circumstance, the deposit 
taking bank would be forced to call in outstanding loans at short notice or sell its 
illiquid assets to meet the withdrawal requests in the absence of alternative sources of 
funds. Where the deposit taking bank is forced to sell a significant portion of its 
assets quickly in order to raise cash to pay depositors, it is likely not to realise the full 
value of its assets as a result of another form of risk known as market risk and it 
could be forced into a distress through the losses resulting from the ‘fire sale’ of 
those assets.18 Where this has happened, the bank could continue to run down its 
assets in the form of deposits in order to pay off immediate liabilities and postpone 
the evil day of the declaration of formal insolvency in the hope that things might get 
better. Given the circumstances, the management of the bank may become 
incentivised to engage in more risky activities in an effort to return to profitability 
when its assets are depleted.19   
Also, due to the nature of some of the products and services offered by 
banks which involves promises to pay or settle in the future, it may be difficult to 
ascertain the exact time when a bank becomes unable to perform its obligations and 
fulfill its contracts.20 This situation is compounded by the fact that banks may be 
capable of concealing and disguising their credit risks by rolling over bad loans or 
raising more deposits from the public by promising higher interest rates and 
increasing the size of their balance sheets to conceal the mismatch between their 
assets and liabilities and their inability to honour their obligations to depositors and 
other creditors.21 It is therefore likely that before a bank reaches the point where it is 
actually unable to pay its debts as they fall due or when its assets and investments 
would have been depleted to an extent that they become lesser that its liabilities, its 
attempt to forge a recovery could make depositors and other creditors incur 
substantial losses on the declaration of formal insolvency on the basis of the cash 
flow test or balance sheet tests of insolvency.22  
In order to reduce the potential losses that may be borne by bank depositors 
as a result of the depletion of bank asset and the taxpayer as a result of government 
intervention in a failing bank, it has been considered necessary to establish a 
framework which creates a seamless link between supervision and resolution by 
making regulatory intervention in the affairs of a bank possible before it becomes 
insolvent on the basis of the balance sheet or cash flow test of insolvency. Noting 
this point, Hüpkes states that ‘…the concept of insolvency, under general 
bankruptcy law, as a trigger for the initiation of insolvency proceedings appears 
inappropriate to apply to banks. Given the need to minimise, if not avoid, credit 
                                                
17 R J Herring and A M Santomero, ‘The Role of the Financial Sector in Economic Performance’ 
Wharton Working Paper 95-08, 19<http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/95/9508.pdf> 
accessed 8 December 2012 
18 Sale of assets at a price lower than they would normally command given a normal search time for 
the highest bidder or adequate time to convey sufficient information about an asset’s real quality. 
19 M H Krimminger and R M Lastra, ‘Early Intervention’ in R M Lastra (ed), Cross-Border Bank 
Insolvency (OUP 2011) 70; E Hupkes, The Legal Aspects of Bank Insolvency: A Comparative Analysis of 
Western Europe, the United States and Canada (Kluwer Law International 2000) 13. 
20  Examples of such products include guarantees and letters of credit given by a bank to its customers 
which may be called up at future dates.  
21  Caprio and Klingebiel, ‘Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad Policy, or Bad Banking’ (n 16) 3.  
22 D G Mayes, ‘Early Intervention and Prompt Corrective Action’ (2009) 9 Bank of Finland 
Discussion Papers 12-13. 
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losses, and the wider economic implications of a bank failure, bank insolvency must 
commence earlier and therefore precede general bankruptcy proceedings.’23 
 
Banks as Publ i c  Uti l i t i es 
While explaining the nature of banks as public utilities in his evidence before 
the Joint Committee on the Draft Financial Bill in the UK, Goodhart compared 
banks to electricity, gas or train companies that cannot be scrapped even when they 
fail in view of the importance of the services they offer and he noted that if these 
companies become insolvent, the worst the government could do would be to 
restructure them, change their management and get them to work again.24 Making a 
similar point and showing that it might even be more important to keep banks alive 
than the above listed utility companies, Gleeson notes that ‘in reality, government 
has little choice but to act to keep these operating come what may, since the 
maintenance of these services is part of the irreducible minimum services which 
electors regard government as created and elected to ensure.’25 He goes on to say that 
‘if an electricity company fails, there is no obvious reason why government should 
support its ordinary commercial creditors…to allow one bank to fail would create a 
knock-on impact for other banks, which would be likely to result in further failures 
and the necessity for further intervention’.26  
In other words, since banks usually have substantial exposure to each other 
through the payment system and unsecured instruments, the disruption in one bank 
may affect other banks and because bank runs tend to be self-reinforcing,27 an 
indication of trouble in one bank may be taken by members of the public (reasonably 
or otherwise) as evidence that other banks in the system are likely to face the same 
problem because banks are volatile institutions that are vulnerable to public 
confidence.28 This means that a single bank failure has an indirect and potentially 
large effect on the economy to the extent that one bank failure could possibly lead to 
or be the catalyst to other bank failures.29 The possibility of such a contagion which 
is often described as ‘systemic risk’ highlights the risk that bank failures pose for the 
wider economy.30 The magnitude of the potential crisis that may result from the 
failure of a single bank is likely to be further amplified to other countries as a result 
of the cross-border operations and linkages of banks.31  
                                                
23 Hüpkes, The Legal Aspects of Bank Insolvency: A Comparative Analysis of Western Europe, the United States 
and Canada (n 18) 12 
24 C Goodhart, Evidence before the Joint Committee on the Draft Financial Services Bill (Tuesday 11 
October 2011) <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/Draft-Financial-Services-
Bill/HC1447iv_11October2011_uncorrected.pdf> accessed 2 January 2013. 
25 S Gleeson, International Regulation of Banking - Basel II: Capital and Risk Requirements (OUP 2010) 21. 
26 Ibid 
27See Herring and Santomero (n 16) 20 
28 E Hüpkes, ‘Insolvency- Why a Special Regime for Banks?’ Current Developments in Monetary and 
Financial Law (2003) 3, 4-5 <www.imf.org/external/np/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/Hupkes.pdf> 
accessed 8 December 2012. 
29 See R Levine, ‘Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence’ in P Aghion and S Surlaf (eds), 
Handbook of Economic Growth (1st edn, Elservier 2005) Chapter 12.  Where the authors discuss the 
potential cost a systemic banking crisis can have on an economy in terms of bail-outs or loss of 
output and employment. 
30 See F Mishkin, ‘Comment on Systemic Risk’ in G Kaufman (ed), Banking, Financial Markets and 
Systemic Risk; Research in Financial Services, Private and Public Policy (vol. 7, JAI Press 1995) 31 
31 It is however possible to argue that the knock on effect of the failure of one bank on other banks 
will be reduced by mechanisms such the deposit insurance and the lender of last resort function of 
central banks, the real time gross settlement systems (RTGS), netting arrangements and arrangements 
for the management of inter-bank contracts in the event of failure. It must however still be noted that 
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In view of these considerations, legislators in various jurisdictions have 
considered it necessary to step in specially to regulate the business of deposit-taking  
conducted by banking institutions in order to protect members of the public who 
make deposits, preserve the vital economic functions the deposit-taking banking 
institutions provide and maintain financial stability by introducing special regulatory 
mechanisms such as minimum capital and liquidity requirements to provide cushion 
for loss absorption and reduction in the possibility of insolvency,  supervisory 
inspection to monitor adherence to stipulated principles for soundness, deposit 
insurance to avoid a rush for the exit and a run which could result in a contagion, 
lender of last resort function to ease out cases of temporary illiquidity, and special 
mechanisms to require early intervention by regulators in cases of disruption, distress 
or impending insolvency in a bank in order  to prevent a spill over to other 
institutions and the potential costs that may be incurred where it is considered 
necessary for the government to rescue the failing banks.  
The exercise of the early intervention powers however infringes on some of 
the safeguards aimed at protecting shareholder interests under corporate law in 
general. These therefore inhibit the effective exercise of the early intervention 
powers of regulators under the special regulatory regime for banks. Before a 
consideration of these corporate safeguards and the ways in which they could inhibit 
the early intervention regime, the next section considers the extant early intervention 
framework in Nigeria and compares this with the position in the UK and the US in 
order to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the Nigerian framework. 
 
2. THE EARLY INTERVENTION FRAMEWORK IN NIGERIA 
In Nigeria, the need for a special regime for bank resolution was recognised 
long before the GFC through the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation Decree of 1988, 
which was replaced by the Nigerian Deposit insurance Act of the same year. The 1988 
Act was subsequently repealed and replaced by the Nigerian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Act of 2006 (NDIC Act) which establishes the Nigerian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC) as the liquidator and receiver of failing banks. This piece of 
legislation is complemented by the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA),32 
which is the central piece of legislation for the regulation of the business of banking 
in Nigeria, the Failed Bank (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Bank Act 
which seeks to punish bank directors, staff and customers who may have contributed 
in any way to the failure of a bank,33  and following the GFC, the Asset Management 
Company of Nigeria Act of 2010 (AMCON Act)  which establishes the Asset 
Management Company of Nigeria (AMCON). 
By section 35 of BOFIA, the CBN is authorised to intervene in the affairs of 
a bank in four major circumstances. These are where the bank is (a) is likely to 
become unable to meet its obligations; (b) is about to suspend payment to any 
extent; (c) is insolvent; and (d) is in a grave situation.  Section 32 of the NDIC Act 
further extends the conditions for intervention in the affairs of an insured bank in 
the country to include cases where the directors or other staff of the bank have (e) 
engaged, are engaging or about to engage in unsafe and unsound practices in the 
conduct of the bank’s business (f) violated, are violating any provisions of the law. 
                                                                                                                                
risk taking, fraud, mismanagement and adverse market conditions are still inseparable bedfellows of 
banking.  See Hüpkes, ‘Insolvency- Why a Special Regime for Banks?’ (n 27) 3-5. 
32 Bank and Other Financial Institutions Act, Cap B3 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 
(BOFIA) 
33 Failed Bank (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Bank Act, Cap F2 Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria 2004 
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These provisions essentially comply with the early trigger recommendations made by 
the IMF and the FSB. It would appear that the early intervention framework is 
dependent on a bank informing the CBN of its inability to meet the conditions listed 
in section 35 of BOFIA because the first three conditions for the early intervention 
under the BOFIA are dependent on the affected bank informing the CBN of its 
inability to meet the conditions listed in the Act.34 However, the fact that the CBN 
and the NDIC may unilaterally intervene following the exercise of their powers of 
routine and special examination of banks,35 is covered under the fourth condition for 
intervention under the BOFIA and the NDIC Act.36 
Clearly, the exercise of these extensive powers can be prone to abuse if not 
properly circumscribed. In this regard, Gleeson has noted that intervention in banks 
must be rapid leaving no room for uncertainty, transparent with creditors and 
counterparties being clear on their positions during and after the intervention.37 
Thus, an effective early intervention regime must be characterized by clarity, 
certainty and speed. In order to spell out the details of the early intervention 
framework in Nigeria, the CBN developed the Contingency Planning for Banking 
Systemic Distresses and Crises (Contingency Framework), which was modeled after 
the Toronto Leadership Forum’s Framework on Contingency Planning for Banking 
System Distress and Crises in 2002.38 Following the GFC, this intervention 
framework was updated through the CBN Intervention Guideline (Intervention 
Guideline or Guideline).39 Realising the possibility of the manipulation of capital 
adequacy ratios (CAR) and likely inefficiency of CAR as indicator of viability and 
measure for intervention in unviable banks,40 the Guideline complements the 
conventional gradated capital adequacy intervention trigger with other indicators. 
Taking cognisance of the overall risk management profile of banking institutions, the 
Intervention Guideline incorporates additional triggers for intervention in the form 
of liquidity, asset quality, risk management, internal control, earnings and systems 
failure complaints. 41   
Thus, although the Intervention Guideline retains the gradated CAR trigger 
approach which divides the capitalisation levels of banks into the four categories of 
under-capitalised banks, significantly under-capitalised banks, critically under-
capitalised and insolvent banks with progressively harsher menu of sanctions to be 
imposed as the capital ratio of a bank decreases, it also adopts a gradated liquidity 
intervention trigger which divides a bank’s level of liquidity into the three classes of 
slightly illiquid, significantly illiquid and critically illiquid and it prescribes the actions 
to be taken by the CBN under each classification. In adopting asset quality as a 
trigger for intervention, the Guideline divides the asset quality of banks into two 
broad categories of weak asset quality and critically weak asset quality on the basis of 
credit administration practice, credit concentration and exposure and provides a 
menu of intervention actions that may be taken by the CBN under each 
classification. For earnings, the regulator is empowered to intervene in a bank when 
                                                
34 BOFIA, ss 35(1) (a)-(c) 
35 BOFIA, ss 32 & 33; NDIC Act, s 30 
36 BOFIA, s 35(1)(d); NDIC Act, ss 29-32 
37 Gleeson, International Regulation of Banking - Basel II: Capital and Risk Requirements (n 24) 29. 
38 CBN, Framework for Contingency Planning For Banking Systemic Distresses and Crises (2002) 
(CBN Contingency Framework) 
39 CBN, CBN Supervisory Intervention Guideline (2011) (CBN Supervisory Intervention Guideline) 
40D G Mayes, ‘Early Intervention and Prompt Corrective Action’ (2009) 9 Bank of Finland 
Discussion Papers 8. 
41CBN Supervisory Intervention Guideline, 7-15. 
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it identifies one of three forms of variations in earnings in the form of declining 
earnings, inconsistent earnings and excessive increase in earnings which could be 
caused by non-compliance with operational guidelines issued by the CBN,42 increase 
in cases of forgeries and fraud, refusal to implement the recommendations of 
internal or other auditors and deliberately misleading the CBN through false 
accounting and reporting.43 The CBN is also empowered to intervene in a bank 
where it considers that the deficiencies in a bank’s risk management practices are 
capable of affecting its viability,44 and where the information technology systems and 
operations of a bank is disrupted for up to five working days and/or such disruption 
prevents the bank from rendering statutory returns to the CBN and the NDIC.45 
The menu of sanctions that may be exercised by the CBN under each head 
of trigger ranges from letters of compliance to the board of the affected bank 
requesting a remedy of the breach in question, spot or special examination of the 
affected bank, a direction to develop an action plan to restore the liquidity, asset 
quality, credit administration and operations of the bank to removing officers or 
directors of the bank regardless of limitations contained in the memorandum or 
articles of association of the bank and appointing replacements and advisers in their 
stead who would be remunerated by the affected bank.46  The CBN in conjunction 
with the NDIC and AMCON could also consider restructuring or liquidating the 
affected bank.47   
The multiple trigger approach adopted under the early intervention 
framework in Nigeria establishes a framework that would enable regulators to 
promptly identify brewing problems in a bank or the banking system and direct the 
focus of regulatory actions by the CBN and the NDIC.48 In view of the importance 
of indicators like liquidity and asset quality to the viability of banking institutions, 
adopting them as triggers for intervention provides the CBN with a potent tool for 
identifying troubled banks well in advance in a way that will help prevent losses to 
depositors and the taxpayer. Given that it may be possible for banks to manipulate 
the accounting treatment of capital, a reliance on a market influenced indicator like 
liquidity presents an indicator that is able to pierce through the opaque nature of the 
accounting books of banks and reflect the true state of affairs through the level of 
confidence market participants repose in a bank, which will affect its liquidity. Also, 
although adequate capital may help reinforce the confidence of the market in a bank, 
the possibility of the loss of this confidence will be dependent on the quality of and 
position of the bank’s assets. The use of the asset quality trigger is therefore 
particularly important in view of the high level of non-performing loans to total 
assets of banks in Africa which is stated to be about three times as high as the level 
in more advanced economies.49 Making asset quality a basis for the trigger of 
                                                
42 Such as the CBN Know Your Customer (KYC) Manual setting out the checks to be conducted by a 
bank before opening an account or engaging in any business transaction with a depositor or customer 
of the bank. See CBN, Know Your Customer Manual for Banks and other Financial Institutions in 
Nigeria http://cenbank.org/OUT/PUBLICATIONS/BSD/2003/KYCM.PDF> accessed 9 June 
2012. 
43 CBN Supervisory Intervention Guideline, 14 
44 Ibid 15 
45 Ibid 
46 BOFIA, s 35(2); NDIC Act, ss 32(1) (c) & 32(2) 
47 BOFIA, s 34; NDIC Act, s 32(2) 
48 CBN Supervisory Intervention Guideline, 2 
49 See L Kasekende, J Bagyenda, M Brownbridge, ‘Basel III and the Global Reform of Financial 
Regulation: How Should Africa Respond? A Bank Regulator’s Perspective’ (2011) 14 
<http://fsbwatch.org/pdf/Basel_III_2011_kasakende.pdf> accessed 21 December 2012 
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regulatory intervention therefore addresses a major concern of the African banking 
system in Nigeria. 
The Intervention Guidelines introduces a measure of certainty and clarity to 
the operation of the early intervention regime in Nigeria and the CBN even  goes 
further to clarify the regulatory intervention regime in the case of a system wide 
crisis.50 This reduces the potential abuse of administrative powers by the CBN and 
the NDIC. It is however, important to consider how this regime compares with the 
framework in other more advanced economies.  
 
3. COMPARISON WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Like the CAR trigger system in Nigeria, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Improvement Act of the United States, specifies a gradated early warning trigger 
system which divides the capitalisation levels of deposit taking banks into the five 
categories of well capitalised banks, adequately capitalised banks, undercapitalised 
banks, significantly undercapitalised banks and critically undercapitalised banks with 
progressively harsher mandatory and optional sanctions to be imposed as the capital 
ratio decreases and a minimum regulatory threshold when a bank should be declared 
insolvent in order to reduce potential losses on insolvency.51 Additionally, section 
11(c)(5)(H) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act lists a number of other mandatory 
and discretionary conditions that may trigger the appointment of the FDIC as a 
conservator to a depository bank as where there is a substantial dissipation of the 
institution’s assets or earnings due to a violation of any statute or any unsafe or 
unsound practice, where the institution is in an unsafe and unsound condition to 
transact business and where the institution has incurred or is likely to incur losses 
that will deplete all or substantially all of its capital. Although the regime in the 
United States was intended to ‘limit supervisory forbearance, delay or failure to take 
appropriate action at financially troubled banks’, in view of the nature capital 
adequacy as a lagging indicator of the viability of a bank, the point has been made 
that supervisory authorities in the US have had to adopt other formal and informal 
measures in determining the triggers for intervention which introduces a substantial 
level of discretion into the early intervention regime.52 While this approach allows a 
measure of qualitative complement to the quantitative assessment provided under 
the regime, it has the potential to allow for more forbearance in intervention.  
In the United Kingdom, the triggers for intervention are not as prescriptive 
as those in the United States or Nigeria. The Banking Act of 2009 enables the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) acting in conjunction with the Treasury and the 
Bank of England to intervene and exercise its stabilising powers in relation to banks 
before the point of insolvency.53 The conditions for intervention in this regard are 
listed to include when a bank is failing, likely to fail or unable to satisfy the 
conditions to permit it to carry on regulated activities.54 Although the conditions 
have been qualified and complemented by the ‘heightened supervision’ approach 
which suggests a measure of increased supervisory oversight over a bank before the 
                                                
50 CBN Supervisory Intervention Guideline, 20-21. 
51 Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act 1991, s 38 
52 J Peek and E S Rosengren, ‘The Use of Capital Ratios to Trigger Intervention in Problem Banks: 
Too Little, Too Late’ (1996) New England Economic Review 53. 
53 The stabilisation powers in this regard refer to the stabilisation options provided in Sections, 11, 12 
and 13 of the Banking Act of 2009 which make provision for private sector purchase, bridge bank and 
temporary public ownership tools respectively.  
54 Banking Act 2009, s 7; M Čihák and E Nier, ‘The Need for Special Resolution Regimes for 
Financial Institutions - The Case of the European Union’ (2009) IMF Working Paper 1, 14 
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adoption of the special resolution regime for failing bank,55 the approach in the 
United Kingdom has been noted to create a regime that gives the authorities 
unfettered powers which could make it difficult to predict regulatory response to 
breaches.56 
Singh in comparing the relative strengths of the early intervention regime in 
the United States, Canada and the UK notes that the success of an early intervention 
regime is not dependent on whether or not the framework is prescriptive or vague 
but on the fact that relevant authorities are in fact able to intervene early enough to 
prevent losses to depositors and ensure continuity in the provision of the essential 
banking services.57 While this assertion may be true in some ways, the prescriptive 
approach must be preferred in an African country like Nigeria. In view of the 
heightened possibility of political interference in the exercise of regulatory 
functions,58 a framework which provides a benchmark against which the actions of 
regulators like the CBN and the NDIC can be assessed for the purpose of 
accountability is more likely to reduce the potential for political interference. Also, 
the possibility that regulators could have conflicting interest which may lead them to 
forbear would also be reduced by a more prescriptive approach to early 
intervention.59 Finally, the need to maximise available skilled regulators in Nigeria 
makes a prescriptive approach that reduces the application of discretion and the 
potential for forbearance a better approach as inexperienced regulators may be 
unable to efficiently balance conflicting interests and concerns in the exercise of 
discretion on a potentially volatile issue.60 
However, in spite of its prescriptive nature, the early intervention and 
resolution powers in Nigeria is faced with a number of challenges and like the case in 
the United States and the United Kingdom where the framework is not as 
prescriptive, it has exposed the taxpayer to potential losses that are currently 
estimated to be about ₦3trillion. At the point of intervention in distressed banks on 
the basis of these prescriptive provisions in the aftermath of the GFC in Nigeria, the 
CBN discovered that as a result of blatant financial misreporting, some of the banks 
had actually completely eroded their shareholder capital base and had started to 
dissipate depositor’s fund.61 The CBN Governor noted that the audit revealed that 
‘Oceanic Bank had negative capital of ₦94.3 billion, Intercontinental Bank ₦330.71 
billion, Bank PHB ₦242.31 billion; Afribank ₦260.9 billion, FinBank ₦104.8 billion, 
Equitorial Trust Bank ₦27.25 billion and Spring Bank ₦87.9 billion.’62 This 
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prompted the CBN to intervene by extending a lifeline to the affected banks to the 
tune of ₦620 billion.63 
Clearly, there remain a number of challenges to the effectiveness of the early 
intervention regime in Nigeria and these would be discussed in the next section 
under the heads of shareholder rights and bank resolution and bolstering the early 
intervention framework in Nigeria.  
 
Shareholder Rights and Bank Resolut ion  
In Nigeria, some corporate law provisions that are generally aimed at 
protecting the interest of shareholders in a company have the potential to inhibit the 
certainty and speed required in the exercise of early intervention powers as a 
resolution tool for effective bank resolution. These are considered below under the 
heads of shareholder approvals, pre-emption rights and Claw-Back, Prejudicial 
Actions & Fraudulent Preferences. 
 
Shareholder Approvals 
Corporate law provisions that make it mandatory for shareholder approval to 
be obtained and sundry other notifications to be made before any material 
transaction is concluded are prime examples of legal provisions that could give rise 
to protracted litigations and inhibit the exercise of early intervention powers. Section 
100 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act Cap C20 LFN (CAMA) which 
mandates that the decisions on the alteration of capital of a company in the form of 
consolidation, conversion, subdivision or cancellation must be made at a general 
meeting of its shareholders and Section 102 CAMA which requires a resolution for 
the increase in the share capital of a company to be approved by the general meeting 
are particularly relevant here as these would have bearing on the ability of regulatory 
authorities to promptly restructure a failing bank under the Nigerian framework even 
if the affected bank is under the control of a new management appointed by the 
CBN or the NDIC. It must be noted that before a general meeting of a company can 
be held under the provisions of section 217 of CAMA, it is mandatory that a notice 
of 21 days from the date of the meeting is sent to every person that is entitled to 
attend the meeting under section 219 of the CAMA specifying the date, place and 
time of the meeting.64 A shorter notice period may only be allowed if the meeting is 
an annual general meeting called by all the members of the company that are entitled 
to attend and vote. In the case of any other general meeting, a majority of members 
with the right to attend and vote would have to call for the meeting and no business 
may be transacted at a general meeting unless the requisite requirements have been 
complied with.65 In addition to the above, section 222 of CAMA specifically provides 
that ‘every public company shall at least twenty one days before a general meeting 
advertise the notice of such meeting in at least two daily newspapers’.66  A company 
seeking to merge with another company and needing to have to increase its capital 
after such merger would have to comply with these provisions which would 
inevitably cause delays and inhibit a speedy restructuring where that is considered 
necessary in a crisis situation. 
                                                
63 Ibid 
64 Persons entitled to attend the meeting in this regard includes every member, legal representative of 
a shareholder, directors of the company, auditor and secretary of the Company. See CAMA, s 218 and 
220 for the full details of the content of the notice for the meeting and the method of service of the 
notice. 
65 See CAMA, ss 217 (2) and  218(3) 
66 CAMA, s 222 
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Similarly, in part XVI of the CAMA which deals with arrangements and 
compromises (i.e. any change in the rights and liabilities of members of creditors of a 
company), which is akin to a restructuring as contemplated under the NDIC Act and 
the BOFIA may only be carried out through court ordered meetings under section 
539 of the CAMA. The arrangement would also have to be sanctioned by a majority 
representing not less than three-quarters of the value of the shares of members at the 
meeting and subsequently certified as fair by the court before it can be regarded as 
binding on all the parties involved.67 An attempt to restructure a bank pursuant to 
early intervention powers would also have to comply with this requirement which 
could result in substantial delays in the resolution of a failing bank. 
 
Pre-emption Rights 
Shareholder pre-emption rights aimed at protecting the interest of 
shareholders in companies against the dilution of their shareholding could also 
constitute hindrance in this regard. In Nigeria, the power to issue shares under 
section 117 of CAMA is stated to be subject to the limitations in the articles of the 
company with respect to the number of authorised shares and pre-emptive rights 
prescribed in the articles of association. Thus, where pre-emptive rights are included 
in a company’s articles of association, any securities issuance by the company would 
have to be done on a pre-emptive basis (i.e. securities on offer must first be offered 
to existing shareholders in proportion to their existing shareholding before an offer 
is made to other interested parties). It is also not unusual for the articles of 
association to stipulate that the offer for subscription on a pre-emptive basis should 
adhere to certain publicity requirements such as publication in national dailies or in 
writing to shareholders and allow a mandatory period of time for shareholders to 
exercise their rights. Again, any attempt at recapitalisation in the exercise of early 
intervention powers would have to comply with this requirement. 
 
Claw-Back, Prejudicial Actions & Fraudulent Preferences 
Other corporate law provisions that could inhibit the application and 
exercise of resolution mechanisms and tools for effective bank resolution include  
the ‘claw-back’ provision that that could void asset transfers made within the 
‘suspect period’ (i.e. the period immediately prior to the commencement of 
insolvency proceedings) and the power of the court to review the prejudicial 
actions of directors. In Nigeria, the courts are empowered to set aside the 
transactions made by directors and other officers of the company on terms that are 
prejudicial to the interest of the company’s stakeholders under the CAMA.68  An 
application for relief under applicable provisions in this regard may be instituted 
under section 390 of CAMA by a member of the company, director, former 
director, creditor, the corporate affairs commission or any other person considered 
by the court to have such rights.  
Thus, where a restructuring or resolution mechanism adopted by the 
directors of a company including those appointed by the NDIC and the CBN 
pursuant to the exercise of early intervention powers is considered by any of these 
persons, to be prejudicial, oppressive or discriminatory to the interest of the 
company, its members or creditors, an action may be instituted in court to 
challenge it and the court is empowered to grant a wide variety of orders that 
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68 See CAMA, ss 311- 312 
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would have the effect of derailing the resolution of a failing bank.69 Also, section 
495 of the CAMA dealing with fraudulent preferences provides that any 
conveyance, mortgage, delivery of goods, payment, execution or other acts relating 
to property that would be deemed as fraudulent preference in the case of an 
individual’s bankruptcy would be so classified if done by or against a company 
within three months to its being declared insolvent and deemed to be invalid. In 
this regard, section 46(1) of the Bankruptcy Act Cap B2 LFN 2004 (Bankruptcy Act) 
defines fraudulent preference as including: 
 
‘Every conveyance, transfer of property or charge thereon made, 
every payment made, every obligation incurred and every judicial 
proceeding taken or suffered by any person unable to pay his debt as 
they become due from his own money in favour of any creditor or 
any person in trust for any creditor with a view to giving such creditor 
or any surety or guarantor for the debt due to such creditor, a 
preference over the other creditors’. 
 
Thus, where a failing bank receives secured capital assistance from an 
investor, the NDIC or the AMCON pursuant to an early intervention initiative and 
subsequently fails within three months of the restructuring or early intervention 
initiative, the transaction and security received which may result in the dilution of 
the interest of extant shareholders and the priority of other creditors of the bank 
could be voided under this provision of Nigerian corporate law.  
From another perspective, the fact that the BOFIA and the Intervention 
Guidelines authorise intervention in a bank when regulatory thresholds are 
breached and not necessarily when a bank is balance sheet or cash flow insolvent as 
in the case of ordinary companies means that regulatory intervention could 
potentially also amount to an infringement of the rights of shareholders. Where in 
the exercise of early intervention and resolution powers, the CBN or the NDIC 
mandate a bank to seek liquidity or capital assistance based on the poor state of 
capital or liquidity levels of the bank, the liquidity assistance would have the effect 
of reducing the potential dividend that may be allocated to shareholders due to the 
need to repay the principal and interest due on the liquidity assistance or the capital 
assistance and this would have the effect of diluting the participating interest of 
existing shareholders in the bank. Where the more drastic early intervention tool of 
the revocation of license, takeover of control of the management of the bank or 
restructuring is exercised, the shareholders could in fact completely lose whatever 
interest they may have left in a failing bank. In view of the fact that the restructuring 
and early intervention directions given by the CBN and the NDIC could be 
mandatory, the overriding effect of the directives on shareholder interests could be 
likened to the compulsory acquisition of the property which runs contrary to the 
well-established principle under Nigerian law for the acquisition of property to be 
consensual.70  
 
4. RESOLVING THE DIVERGENCE: SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS AS 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The approach of treating the rights accruable to shareholders as property 
rights is a recognised principle of law that is confirmed in the case of Bank PHB v 
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CBN and 2 Others where the court noted that ‘Where association, whether private or 
public companies, are formed for profit, the value created in enterprises undertaken 
by such companies augments their capital structure and forms part of the assets of 
the company. This property resides in the shareholders proportionate to the equity 
they respectively hold in the Company’s Capital Structure’.71 An action challenging 
the restructuring effort of the NDIC or the CBN could therefore be instituted on 
grounds of the breach of property rights which is a right guarded and regulated by 
constitutional provisions. In this regard, section 44(1) of the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (Nigerian Constitution), like the Universal 
Declaration of Human rights,72 the African Declaration on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights73 guarantee that no moveable property (or interest in an immovable 
property) shall be taken possession of compulsorily.  
The requirements for meetings, notices, court orders, sanctions, special 
approval by shareholders for arrangements or increases in a company’s capital, pre-
emptive rights, fraudulent preferences, claw back provisions and constitutional 
protection of property rights of shareholders as contemplated in the foregoing 
would result in delays and make it challenging to promptly adopt or implement early 
intervention powers for effective resolution of troubled banks. The inhibitive 
effects of some these provisions on the exercise and application of resolution 
powers and mechanisms were highlighted in the aftermath of the GFC in Nigeria. 
Attempts to exercise resolution powers by taking over the management of banks, 
removing erring chief executives and directors, arranging restructurings for the 
resolution of troubled banks following the CBN/NDIC audit of the Nigerian 
banking sector in 2009 were greeted by protest and a number of litigious suits were 
filed challenging the validity of regulatory responses and seeking to upturn 
regulatory and resolution actions. 74   
Thus, although section 53 of the BOFIA purports to permit the exercise of 
the powers conferred under the BOFIA without prejudice to the provisions of 
CAMA, the fact that shareholders rights have been likened to property right by the 
courts in Nigeria which is a constitutionally guaranteed right makes a reliance on 
this line of argument a failing one as any law that is inconsistent with the provision 
of the constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.75 However, in view of 
the utilitarian nature and functions of banks, a balance must be struck between the 
object of shareholder protection and financial stability and the argument here is that 
the balance must be tilted in favour of a system that guarantees the exercise of early 
intervention powers in bank resolution with safeguards to prevent arbitrariness and 
abuse to the interest of shareholders which these corporate law mechanisms aim to 
achieve.  
The possibility of tilting the balance in favour of general public interest of 
financial stability is in fact contemplated by the constitutional mechanisms that 
guarantee and protect property rights.76 The African Charter on Human and 
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People’s Right on its part provide that the right to property may ‘be encroached 
upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and 
in accordance with the provisions of appropriate law’.77 Similarly, the Nigerian 
Constitution states that the right to possession of property could be denied if it is 
done in the manner and for the purpose prescribed by a law that among other 
things ‘(a) requires the prompt payment of compensation thereof and (b) gives to 
any person claiming such compensation a right of access for determination of his 
interest in the property and the amount of compensation to a court of law or 
tribunal or body having jurisdiction in that part of Nigeria’.78  This is in line with the 
provision of the constitution, which guarantees a right to fair hearing for every 
individual with a reasonable time before the courts in the determination of an issue 
against any government or authority.79  
The three elements of public interest, compensation and judicial review are 
therefore vital considerations that should be incorporated into the administrative 
resolution framework circumscribing the corporate and constitutional rights of the 
shareholders in a bank in the event of intervention by regulators under the early 
intervention regime. While it may be argued that section 44(2) of the Nigerian 
constitution which lists the administration of property in the invent of insolvency as 
one of the cases under which the need for compensation and public hearing may be 
unnecessary, the fact that an intervened bank should not be balance sheet or cash 
flow insolvent before regulatory intervention makes this a failing argument.  
However, as noted by Ogundare JSC in UNTHMB v Nnoli ‘where a public 
body fails to comply with certain procedural safeguards in an enabling Act or 
Regulations, there is breach of a duty on it and its decision in such circumstances is 
ultra vires’. 80  Thus, in order to avoid a challenge to the validity of actions that 
impinge on shareholder rights under the early intervention framework in Nigeria, 
special provisions would have to be made for a form of judicial review and 
compensation of aggrieved shareholders under a framework that ensures that 
regulatory responses are generally taken in the public interest. While the need to 
preserve financial stability would generally satisfy the public interest elements for 
intervention, the framework for compensation and judicial review would have to be 
worked out. The World Bank and the IMF in a advocating the establishment of a 
regime with clear rules for early intervention in this regard has noted that the 
judicial review that should be adopted for regulatory actions under the early 
intervention framework must be such that would not lead to a reversal of the 
decisions and actions of applicable supervisory or resolution authorities so as ensure 
financial stability. Instead, persons, whose rights are found to have been infringed 
by regulatory actions following the judicial review should be entitled to monetary 
compensation  in the form of damages.  Clearly the nature and framework of such a 
framework for the judicial review of the administrative actions of regulatory bodies 
like the CBN and the NDIC calls for further research in this field of study. 
 
5. CONCLUSION: BOLSTERING THE EARLY INTERVENTION 
REGIME IN NIGERIA 
It must be noted that for an early intervention regime to function effectively, 
the mechanism and procedure for generating the information that form the basis of 
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the indicators that trigger intervention under the framework must be efficient and 
devoid of manipulation or fraud. Where the information reported in financial reports 
of banks or those reported to supervisory authorities is manipulated, the early 
intervention regime would amount to no more than ‘shadow chasing’ as regulatory 
and supervisory authorities would be unable to ascertain the true position of things 
in a failing bank.  
Gravitt and Johnston identify the forms of financial statement fraud to include (a) 
falsification, alteration or manipulation of financial records, supporting documents, 
(b) intentional omissions or misrepresentations in financial statements, (c) deliberate 
misapplication of accounting principles, policies and procedures to which I would 
add the use of inappropriate electronic accounting and reporting software.81 Where 
any of these goes on within a bank, it would compromise the integrity of the 
information which forms the basis of the trigger for regulatory intervention in a 
bank. 
In order to address the possibility of financial reporting fraud in Nigeria,  
section 27 of the NDIC Act, section 33 of the CBN Act and section 30 of the 
BOFIA cumulatively provide that where a person required to provide information to 
the NDIC or the CBN fails to supply the information or supplies information which 
he knows to be false or has been reckless in ascertaining the truth or falsity of the 
information supplied, he is deemed to have committed an offence and would be 
liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment. In view of the fact that the liability 
for the integrity of financial statements is placed on directors of banks under section 
28(3) of BOFIA, a breach of the provisions relating to the need to ensure the 
integrity of financial report means existing directors and other persons found guilty 
under these provisions would be permanently prevented from acting as directors in a 
bank by virtue of sections 44(1)(c) of the BOFIA and 254 of the CAMA which deal 
with the disqualification of directors for offences. In spite of these provisions, the 
Deputy Governor of the CBN recently noted the financial reporting fraud 
committed by banks in Nigeria in aftermath of the GFC.82 While the cases of recent 
criminal prosecution of bank management officers has sent the signals about the 
readiness of the CBN to enforce the provisions of the law in this regard, the fact that 
the financial reporting fraud committed were not detected by the management, 
board of directors, audit committees, internal auditors and external auditors of  the 
affected banks or by the CBN and the NDIC until the conduct of the special audit 
reinforces the view that more still has to be done to complement and reinvigorate 
the effectiveness of the  supervisory processes of the authorities in Nigeria.  
The CBN recently developed an electronic platform for accurate and prompt 
submission and supervision of individual and consolidated financial statements of 
banks through the electronic financial analysis and surveillance system (e-FASS), 
which require banks to submit daily, weekly, mid-monthly, quarterly and semi-annual 
returns in prescribed formats.83 Undoubtedly, the e-FASS presents a good approach 
to information gathering for early intervention purposes. While it may be argued that 
compliance with these reporting obligations would be time consuming and costly, 
the possibility of a speedy devaluation of bank assets and the consideration of the 
costs that a lax reporting system could cause to the taxpayer as experienced in the 
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aftermath of the GFC in the Nigeria are justifiable reasons for the adoption of the 
current approach.  
The adoption of the e-FASS has however made information technology 
inextricably linked to the task of financial reporting in Nigeria and the CBN must 
ensure that banks adopt best practices in effective information technology 
governance. The review of information technology framework in banks must not be 
limited to cases where a break down disrupts the provision of services to customers 
or affects the promptness of financial reporting obligations as contemplated under 
the Intervention Guidelines. The platforms and portals of all participating banks 
must be properly examined on a regular basis in order to ensure that applicable 
software for the financial reporting framework are not counterfeited or 
compromised. In order to achieve this objective of sound information technology 
governance, a special team on information technology must be established in the 
Banking Supervision Department of the CBN, which should be saddled, with the 
task of regular on-site examination of the information technology apparatus and 
governance framework of banks in Nigeria. 
 
 
 
 
